I follow with great interest—and with some concern—the intensity of the debate surrounding the gas deal between Egypt and Israel.
Hundreds of comments have reached me: some supportive, viewing the deal as a smart commercial transaction; others opposed, considering it a strategic and moral mistake. Between the two, the discussion at times drifted away from its essence into personal accusations that I find neither useful nor fair.
That is why I am writing this article—not to defend one opinion, nor to attack another, but to try to understand the full picture, and to acknowledge that the issue is more complex than a slogan and more dangerous than an ordinary deal.
Especially since the devil lies in the details, which I do not claim to fully know.
First: What is the deal in its simplest form?
We are not talking about “selling Egyptian gas to Israel,” as was the case in the past. Rather, we are talking about importing gas from Israeli fields in the Eastern Mediterranean into Egypt, through an existing pipeline that has been reused in the reverse direction, within the framework of commercial contracts between companies, under a broader umbrella of political and security agreements.
The declared objectives of these arrangements were:
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To benefit from Egypt’s gas liquefaction plants (Idku and Damietta), an advantage most countries in the region do not possess;
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To transform Egypt into a regional gas trading hub;
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And at the same time, to fill potential gaps in local market needs when necessary.
Second: Why was Egypt an exporter and then became an importer?
This is a legitimate question, and the answer should not be purely political.
Egypt exported gas when production exceeded consumption.
Then domestic consumption rose rapidly (population growth, electricity, industry), while investment declined during certain periods, causing the balance to break.
Later, the discovery of the Zohr field restored some balance, but the energy sector by nature is cyclical and volatile, affected by prices, debt, investment, and politics.
The shift from exporting to importing is not a scandal in itself, but it is an indicator of an imbalance that must be acknowledged and addressed—not denied or justified.
Third: Is Israeli gas for local consumption or for re-export?
The truth is: both.
In years of relative surplus, part of the gas (Egyptian or coming from the Eastern Mediterranean) is liquefied and re-exported, generating revenue and operating important infrastructure.
In years of shortage, priority inevitably goes to the local market, electricity generation, and industry.
The problem does not lie in liquefaction itself, but in the deeper question:
Do we have the luxury of relying—even partially—on a strategic adversary for a commodity that directly touches national security?
Fourth: Is the price lower than the global price?
There is no single “global price” for gas.
In general:
Gas transported via pipelines is cheaper than liquefied natural gas (LNG), as it avoids liquefaction and shipping costs.
During periods of high global energy prices, Israeli gas may appear more cost-effective.
But price alone is not enough to judge. There are contractual conditions, minimum quantity commitments, and political risks that cannot be measured in dollars.
Is this deal an “extension of deals made before 2011”?
Here, history must be separated carefully.
During the Mubarak era, Egypt exported gas to Israel via the EMG pipeline (Arish–Ashkelon), before this later stopped, followed by disputes and arbitration between 2008 and 2012.
Now, however, the direction is reversed: gas comes from Israeli fields into Egypt through the same corridor after being reconfigured.
So similarity in title (gas between two countries) does not mean identity in substance.
The substance now is that Egypt is trying to play the role of a “regional hub” by operating liquefaction and trading infrastructure, while at the same time addressing recurring domestic shortages.
Where Is the “National Interest,” and Where Is the “Risk”?
Potential gains (if managed wisely):
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Operating liquefaction plants and creating added value, fees, and logistical services;
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Diversifying supply sources in years of shortage;
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Strengthening Egypt’s position as a transit route and hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Clear risks:
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Relying on a strategic adversary for a sensitive commodity (energy/electricity);
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Regional security and political volatility that could disrupt supplies;
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The risk that the “regional hub” role turns into a “pressured intermediary” if the domestic market itself is already suffering from gas shortages.
Here comes the sentence that sparked controversy:
“It is not right to rely on your strategic adversary to provide energy.”
This is a well-known national security argument. The response usually comes from a political economy perspective:
“We are not relying completely; we are diversifying, and benefiting from cost differences and existing infrastructure.”
The disagreement is legitimate—provided it does not turn into personal accusations.
“My agreement or disagreement with today’s deal has nothing to do with past or future political affiliations. We are talking about a deal under different conditions, at a different time, and in a different market. I am discussing a principle: energy security should not be built on a strategic adversary. At the same time, I do not deny that there is an economic logic presented by supporters. Let us discuss facts instead of distributing accusations.”
Fifth: Where Does the Logic of Interests End… and Where Does the Danger of Dependence Begin?
Here lies the heart of the matter.
Yes, states deal in interests.
Yes, the modern economy recognizes interdependence even among adversaries.
But there is a difference between:
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Limited, calculated trade within a framework of diversified sources; and
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Long-term structural dependence in a vital file such as energy.
My opinion—and it is only an opinion—is that logic and strategic reasoning warn against building energy security on a single source coming from a strategic adversary, even if the price seems suitable and even if the deal is described as “purely commercial.”
This does not mean accusing those who see an economic gain of treason, nor does it mean ignoring realistic calculations. It simply means that national security cannot be managed by market logic alone.
The discussion here is not about the past, but about how we think today—and how we disagree without becoming enemies.
We may differ on:
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Is the deal a temporary necessity or a strategic mistake?
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Does economic interest justify political risk?
But what we should not differ on is this:
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Asking questions is not treason.
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Defending economic calculations is not collaboration.
Between these two boundaries alone can a healthy debate be born—within a society that thinks.
