In recent years, a term that may sound unfamiliar to many people has begun appearing repeatedly in the news: the Abraham Accords.

Citizens hear the name, but many may wonder: Is it a religious agreement? A political one? An economic initiative? And why does the United States support it with such enthusiasm?

In reality, the Abraham Accords began as agreements to normalize relations between Israel and a number of Arab states. Over time, however, they evolved into something much larger than merely exchanging ambassadors or opening direct flight routes.

The project’s underlying idea is that instead of remaining trapped by old conflicts, the countries of the region should begin building networks of economic, technological, and security relationships that make cooperation more beneficial than hostility.

The United States chose the name “Abraham” because Muslims, Christians, and Jews all regard Abraham as a spiritual patriarch. The message, in essence, is that peoples who share a common historical heritage can choose cooperation over conflict.

On paper, the idea appears appealing. Who would not want a more stable Middle East? Who would oppose greater employment opportunities, increased investment, and scientific and technological cooperation that benefits ordinary people?

Yet politics is judged not only by intentions but also by outcomes, and this is where the debate begins.

Supporters of the project see it as a historic opportunity to end decades of hostility. They argue that economic development may open doors to peace that wars have failed to unlock.

Opponents, however, contend that the region’s fundamental problem remains unresolved: the Palestinian issue.

They raise a logical question: How can a lasting peace be built while millions of Palestinians continue to feel that their national rights have been denied?

For this reason, many critics argue that the Abraham Accords put the cart before the horse, beginning normalization before achieving a just settlement of the conflict.

The United States, on the other hand, believes the opposite—that building networks of shared interests may eventually facilitate more realistic political solutions. Between these two perspectives, the debate continues.

But beyond political positions, one fact is undeniable: the Middle East is undergoing a major process of transformation. Old alliances are shifting, economic power has become a tool of influence no less important than military strength, and technology has emerged as a new strategic asset.

In this changing world, every state is seeking to secure its place, protect its interests, and shape the future of its coming generations.

For Egypt, the principle has remained constant: peace is a noble goal, but genuine peace can only be complete when all parties feel a sense of justice, security, and dignity.

A peace built solely on interests may last for years; a peace built on justice can endure for generations.

Perhaps this is the most important question that will determine the future of the entire region: Can the Abrahamic project evolve from a set of political and economic arrangements into a comprehensive peace in which everyone feels they are stakeholders in a shared future?

My answer is no.

What is certain is that what is happening today is not merely an agreement among states. It is an attempt to redraw the map of the Middle East for years—perhaps decades—to come.

There is a difference between peace as the absence of war and peace as a condition of justice and balance.

The question is: Can economics achieve through the Abraham Accords what politics has failed to accomplish?

Let us examine the positions of Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey’s Position

Turkey’s position on the Abraham Accords is complex because it combines political opposition with practical pragmatism.

Turkey initially opposed the agreements. When they were signed in 2020, the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was among their strongest critics. Ankara argued that certain Arab states had normalized relations with Israel without securing meaningful gains for the Palestinians, thereby weakening the Palestinian position.

The Turkish paradox is that despite this criticism, Turkey itself was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel, doing so in 1949, and it has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel for decades.

In the years that followed, Turkey began improving its relations with several Gulf states that had joined the Abraham Accords. Relations between Turkey and Israel also experienced alternating periods of rapprochement and renewed tension.

Some analysts argued that Ankara did not want to find itself excluded from any new regional order emerging in the Middle East.

In recent months, the U.S. president has encouraged Turkey to join the regional framework associated with the Abraham Accords. Ankara responded that it does not oppose relations with Israel in principle, but that any major development depends on improvements in Palestinian conditions and an end to military operations in Gaza.

Turkey’s foreign minister stated that the restoration of fully normal relations depends upon ending the violence and allowing essential humanitarian supplies into Gaza.

In short, Turkey is not opposed to normalization with Israel in principle. It has recognized Israel for more than seventy-five years. However, it opposes joining the Abrahamic project in its current form unless it includes meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue. At the same time, it does not wish to be excluded from any emerging regional order in the Middle East.

This point may be particularly significant in any broader discussion: Has the regional divide become one between a “normalization camp” and a “rejection camp”? Or are most states—including Turkey—now acting primarily according to calculations of national and regional interests rather than ideological slogans?

That question may explain much of what is happening in the contemporary Middle East.

Egypt’s Position

Egypt, on the other hand, was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For more than four decades, the two countries have maintained full diplomatic relations, security cooperation in certain areas, multiple economic and trade agreements, and, in recent years, cooperation in energy and natural gas.

Yet this official peace has never evolved into broad popular acceptance or societal reconciliation.

There are several interconnected reasons for this.

First: Historical Memory

Successive generations of Egyptians lived through the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, during which thousands lost their lives. Such national memories do not easily disappear from the collective consciousness.

Second: The Palestinian Issue

For many Egyptians, Israel is not viewed merely as a neighboring state but as a party to an ongoing conflict with the Palestinian people. Whenever violence escalates in Gaza or the West Bank, public opposition tends to intensify once again.

Third: The Difference Between Peace and Normalization

A large segment of Egyptian society accepts peace as a necessity to prevent war, yet does not believe that peace necessarily requires normal cultural, social, or emotional relations.

This gave rise to the well-known expression: “Peace between governments, not between peoples.”

Fourth: Lack of Trust

Many Egyptians continue to question Israel’s long-term strategic intentions toward the region. They believe that the conflict has not been fundamentally resolved but merely frozen.

For this reason, the term “cold peace” has often been used to describe Egyptian-Israeli relations. Official relations remain stable, but popular and cultural relations have remained limited compared to what is usually seen between countries that have fully reconciled.

From a broader intellectual perspective, Egypt presents a unique model.

It is a country that chose strategic peace in 1979, yet has not achieved comprehensive popular reconciliation with Israel to this day.

This raises an important question:

Is signing treaties enough to create peace? Or does genuine peace require mutual feelings of justice, trust, and respect for the rights of all parties?

Perhaps this is precisely why many Egyptians differ from the American vision of the Abraham Accords. While Washington believes that economic cooperation can gradually lead to political and social acceptance, many Egyptians believe that addressing the core Palestinian issue is what can open the door to genuine popular peace—not the other way around.

This distinction may be a crucial point in any discussion of the Abraham Accords: the difference between official peace and societal peace, between signing agreements and winning the hearts and minds of peoples.

The Egyptian experience over the past five decades offers a living example of that distinction.