
In international relations, a state may possess the greatest military and economic power, yet what gives it lasting influence is not power alone, but credibility.
States may fear power, but they do not build stable partnerships without trust in commitments.
In recent decades, the image of the United States in this regard has faced visible erosion.
Washington has withdrawn from international agreements, reinterpreted them, or bypassed them when its political or strategic calculations changed.
In modern international politics, treaties are not always treated as permanent obligations, but sometimes as temporary tools subject to revision when interests shift.
After World War II, the United States appeared as one of the architects of an international system based on institutions and agreements.
However, later decades witnessed a series of events that led many countries to reconsider that image.
The U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement and later rejoined after a change of administration.
It withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, despite the agreement being multilateral and endorsed by the UN Security Council.
It also left the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, one of the pillars of nuclear stability since the Cold War.
Trade agreements were also reconsidered or renegotiated, including agreements with Canada and Mexico that had once been presented as diplomatic achievements.
These actions are not seen merely as isolated political decisions, but as part of a broader pattern in which treaties in American policy sometimes shift from long-term commitments to flexible instruments subject to change with each administration.
Such behavior does not pass without consequence.
Trust in international relations is like invisible capital —
it takes years to build, but can erode quickly when commitments are repeatedly broken.
In political philosophy, credibility is considered one of the foundations of international stability.
Realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger argued that the international system rests not only on the balance of power, but also on the balance of trust.
If agreements lose their meaning, negotiation becomes merely a temporary stop in a continuing struggle for power.
This is why some countries have become more cautious in negotiations with the United States.
Negotiation assumes good faith and a desire for stable compromise.
But historical experience has led some actors to fear that negotiations may sometimes serve as a way to gain time while realities on the ground are being reshaped.
In the logic of realpolitik, the weaker side may face a dilemma:
Should it rely on negotiation,
or fear that negotiation itself may become a cover for stronger measures later?
Yet abandoning negotiation entirely is not a solution either, because the alternative may be escalation or open confrontation.
What is changing today is that states increasingly believe that negotiating with a superpower whose credibility has been questioned requires stronger guarantees and broader international frameworks.
Power alone can impose an agreement.
But it cannot impose trust.
And the question facing the international system today is:
Can the United States rebuild its moral and political credibility,
or has the era of unconditional trust in its commitments already come to an end?


