Who are our friends and who are our enemies? Why has there been estrangement between Egypt and Iran, and is Iran really an enemy of Egypt? Where does Egypt stand in the current regional arrangements? Have we identified our historical enemies and are our eyes on the “shifting friend”? All these questions ran through my mind as I thought about the philosophy of our foreign policy.
I once asked a prominent former Egyptian Foreign Minister: who actually makes Egypt’s foreign policy? How are directions and objectives determined? He said: the Presidential Palace, the General Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The role of the Foreign Ministry largely depends on the personality of the minister. Sometimes the minister presents well-studied alternatives, and sometimes he is merely an executor of what the president and his team dictate.
Sometimes, when the Foreign Minister is strong, a policy maker with a position, this may conflict with the president’s directions, leading him to resign or be replaced.
There are also certain issues where one institution takes the lead, depending on the nature, intensity, and urgency of the events.
In Egyptian political history, resignations of Foreign Ministers due to clear disagreements with the president are not common, because the position is usually tightly aligned with the president’s vision. However, there are notable names whose resignations or departures were linked to political or strategic disagreements with the leadership. The most prominent examples include:
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Ismail Fahmy, who became Foreign Minister after the October War under Anwar Sadat. He was one of the leading diplomats managing Egypt’s diplomatic opening after the war. He resigned in 1977 in protest against Sadat’s move to go to Jerusalem and negotiate directly with Israel before sufficient Arab preparation. This resignation is considered one of the most significant political resignations in modern Egyptian diplomacy.
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Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Foreign Minister under Sadat, resigned in 1978 during the Camp David negotiations, objecting to the direction of talks with Menachem Begin and his view that they involved major concessions.
There are also senior Foreign Ministers who had differences in vision or political assessment with the presidency but did not resign formally; their service ended in other ways. These cases reveal the sensitive nature of the relationship between diplomacy and presidential decision-making in Egypt. The most notable example is:
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Amr Moussa, Foreign Minister under Hosni Mubarak (1991–2001), who gained wide Arab popularity due to his candid positions regarding Israel and regional policies. Many political analyses suggest that his strong political presence and popularity created some tension with the presidency. He did not resign but moved to the post of Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001.
Once again, I asked myself about institutional decision-making. As citizens, we often do not know why we approach a country or distance ourselves from another. Yesterday’s enemy becomes today’s friend, and yesterday’s friend becomes a clear enemy—or “secretly hostile,” as the saying goes.
As I understand it, interests reconcile, and the balance of power shifts according to our economic strength, internal stability (without vulnerabilities exposing the country to risks), and the extent of our military influence in events.
Thus, our foreign policy changes depending on how much we need others, and how much others need us—as the largest commercial market in the region with a population that extends beyond our borders—and depending on our ability to face military threats, or our virtual ability to threaten other states.
When Egypt was at war with Israel during the era of global bipolarity, the United States prioritized us due to our influence on regional security, especially concerning Israel. When we reconciled, and no alternative emerged to maintain that influence, Egypt lost its priority with the West, unfortunately. We did not fill the gap left by the transition from war to peace with sustainable development that would have increased demand for Egyptian labor, nor with economic development that would have made everyone eager to engage with the vast Egyptian market.
Now, with the wealthy Gulf states reconciling and moving toward advanced modernization—even with a traditional enemy—and opening fields of cooperation that we had closed (despite having taken the peace initiative before them), and with the changing global balance of power, including unipolar and bipolar standards by the U.S. and U.K., which led to the destruction of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Sudan, I believe Egypt must carve out a new role and consider future factors.
I then asked: can a single individual, no matter their capabilities as president or king, even with assistants, determine the steps of the future? Variables change daily. Isn’t it our duty to establish specialized research and study institutions, giving the decision-maker dozens of current and future studies? I would even go further: we should integrate artificial intelligence, its devices, and tools with human intellect to grasp and simulate as many scenarios as possible.
I would go even further to suggest that, as others do, we sometimes need to shape perceptions and make them reality, as intelligence and propaganda agencies have done in various circumstances—leading to revolutions and the destruction of economies that could have led regional development.
We must think proactively and take initiative rather than simply reacting to events, which diminishes our ability to lead.
This means Egypt should have a philosophy in managing its internal and foreign policies. What should it be?
It is certainly not a philosophy of mere mediation, nor is it one of passivity or hiding. I believe our Gulf, Arab, and African spheres require a distinct color, and we must find our competitive advantage in each.
What is our intrinsic strength that makes Egypt heavier on the scale?
At one point, Egypt’s philosophy was exporting the revolution against traditional colonialism, which gained us supporters and enemies.
In more recent times, Egypt’s soft power shaped the consciousness of all Arabs, and its philosophy was to spread, nurture, finance, and open avenues for creative freedom.
Egypt exported labor, starting with teachers who spread across the Arab world, educating its children. Most of the first generation of Arab and African leaders studied in Egyptian universities.
Education and culture were our tools of influence, giving Egypt its position. Technical labor was also the backbone of development in Arab countries due to its sufficiency, skill, and low cost, leading to millions of Egyptian farmers and workers in those countries.
And now? Who studies, analyzes, and researches new pathways of influence—African, Arab, European, and global?
We face a huge task: building the domestic front to enhance our value abroad. We need a philosophy, a plan, and follow-up implementation. But above all, we must have a flexible vision that maintains direction and initiates action positively.
