I am a man of science. I research, analyze, and believe that I have the right to express my views about my country. I am also an active user of technology and artificial intelligence. I have educated myself and attended scientific courses at some of the most prestigious academic institutions, opening new windows of knowledge and discovery. This has led me to realize that, whether in medicine or literature, scientific research or the administration of states and armies, those who do not possess the tools of technological and digital knowledge, including artificial intelligence, will lack the ability to compete. This is why I am writing this article.
Military technology is no longer merely a supporting factor in warfare; it has become the primary determinant of the nature of power and a country’s position in the regional balance of power. The transformation is not simply quantitative (the number of tanks or aircraft), but qualitative: whoever controls the technological chain—from design and upgrades to maintenance and software—holds the real decision-making power, not merely the party that operates the military equipment on a daily basis.
This leads me to consider the following points:
First: The Gap Between Ownership and Use
Egypt, like many countries in the region, possesses a substantial conventional military arsenal, including aircraft, naval vessels, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. However, a significant portion of this arsenal depends on foreign technology in three critical areas:
Software and Algorithms:
These include guidance systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and network integration.
Maintenance and Upgrades:
Sensitive components, such as engines, radars, and communication systems, often require continuous support from the manufacturer or supplying country.
Supply Chains:
These range from smart munitions and precision spare parts to sensitive materials subject to political and export restrictions.
In practical terms, this means that the ability to operate these systems at full capacity could be affected during a moment of local or regional tension if the supplier decides to restrict support or upgrades.
This does not mean that the Egyptian Armed Forces are not independent or powerful. It does, however, mean that their margin of strategic autonomy is narrower than the size of their arsenal might suggest.
Second: The Changing Nature of Warfare
Modern wars are no longer decided by the number of military platforms alone, but by three interconnected factors:
Situational Awareness and Network Integration
The ability to monitor the battlefield and integrate data from drones, satellites, and radar systems in near real time.
Electronic and Cyber Warfare
These capabilities include disrupting an adversary’s systems or protecting one’s own, and their impact can sometimes exceed that of direct military engagement.
Drones and Precision-Guided Weapons
These technologies have lowered the cost of applying pressure on an adversary and redefined what is meant by “air superiority” and “control of the sea.”
In this context, investing in personnel trained to operate these systems, alongside developing domestic capabilities—even partially—in software and maintenance, becomes more important than simply increasing the number of conventional military platforms.
Third: Technology as an Instrument of Political Influence
Countries that possess advanced technologies—the United States, certain European countries, Israel, China, and Russia—do not merely sell military systems; they also sell a degree of dependency.
This dependency can be used, explicitly or implicitly, to influence the decisions of importing countries on regional issues.
In Egypt’s case, given its location in a region characterized by competition over maritime corridors, particularly the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, any restrictions on its military or intelligence capabilities could weaken its position in negotiations or crises involving its borders or economic interests.
Fourth: Human Resources and Technology
Egypt has a relative advantage in the size of its human resources within the military and research institutions. However, transforming this resource into technological power requires:
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Long-term training programs on advanced systems, going beyond basic operational use.
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Establishing local research and development environments, even if they begin through limited partnerships, to reduce complete dependence on foreign suppliers.
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Linking engineering and scientific education to defense and national security requirements, ensuring that skilled professionals do not remain merely operators of foreign technology.
My Conclusion, From a Scientific Perspective
Military technology today should not be measured by what is displayed in military parades, but by what a country can operate with relative independence during times of tension.
A large arsenal provides important conventional deterrence, but it is not sufficient if the ability to upgrade systems, conduct electronic warfare, and maintain network integration remains dependent on an external decision.
Egypt’s real challenge is not to acquire more equipment, but to build a layer of technological independence—in maintenance, software, and training—so that Egypt remains in control of the decisions governing the use of its military power, rather than merely being a user of that power.
This is the difference between an army that looks powerful on paper and one that is truly capable of protecting national interests in a rapidly changing regional environment.
In the end, everything I have written may seem self-evident, and the Egyptian leadership may already be fully aware of it. However, since we do not have access to the information or know the details, it is our duty to raise the issue and draw attention to it.
